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Abstract
We continue recent investigations into the problem of reason-
ing about typicality. We do so in the framework of Propo-
sitional Typicality Logic (PTL), which is obtained by enrich-
ing classical propositional logic with a typicality operator and
characterized by a preferential semantics a` la KLM. In this
paper we study different notions of entailment for PTL. We
take as a starting point the notion of Rational Closure deﬁned
for KLM-style conditionals. We show that the additional ex-
pressivity of PTL results in different versions of Rational Clo-
sure for PTL — versions that are equivalent with respect to
the conditional language originally proposed by KLM.
1 Introduction
Propositional Typicality Logic (PTL) (Booth, Meyer, and
Varzinczak 2012; 2013) is a recently proposed logic allow-
ing for the representation of and reasoning with a notion of
typicality. It is obtained by enriching classical propositional
logic with a typicality operator ‚, the intuition of which is
to capture the most typical (or normal) situations (worlds) in
which a given formula holds.
PTL is characterised using a preferential semantics simi-
lar to that proposed by Shoham (1988) and extensively de-
veloped by Kraus et al. (1990) and by Lehmann and Magi-
dor (1992; 1995). It can also be viewed as an enriched ver-
sion of the conditional logic originally studied by Kraus and
colleagues.
In spite of the nonmonotonic features introduced by the
adoption of a preferential semantics, the obvious deﬁnition
of entailment for PTL (i.e., a Tarski-style consequence op-
erator) remains monotonic. Such a notion of entailment is
inappropriate in nonmonotonic contexts, in particular when
reasoning about typicality.
In this paper we investigate different, alternative notions
of entailment for PTL. We start by proposing a set of
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desiderata that any notion of entailment deemed as appro-
priate with regard to typicality ought to satisfy. Central to
these desiderata is the notion of Rational Closure as de-
ﬁned by Lehmann and Magidor for KLM-style condition-
als in a propositional setting (Lehmann and Magidor 1992).
We show that different deﬁnitions of Rational Closure, that
are equivalent with respect to the conditional language orig-
inally proposed by Kraus et al., in the framework of PTL
result in distinct kinds of closure. Finally we prove that it
is not possible to deﬁne in PTL a notion of entailment that
satisﬁes all our desiderata.
2 Background
Logical preliminaries
We work in a propositional language over a ﬁnite set of
propositional atoms P . In later sections we adopt a richer
language. We use p, q, . . . as meta-variables for atoms.
Propositional formulae (and in later sections, formulae of
the richer language) are denoted by α, β, . . ., and are recur-
sively deﬁned in the usual way: α ::“ p | α | α ^ α. All
the other Boolean truth-functional connectives (_, Ñ, Ø,
. . . ) are deﬁned in terms of  and ^ in the standard way. We
use J as an abbreviation for p _ p, and K for p ^ p, for
some p P P . With L we denote the set of all propositional
formulae.
We denote by U the set of all valuations v : P ÝÑ t0, 1u.
Sometimes we shall represent the valuations of the logic un-
der consideration as sets of literals (i.e., atoms or negated
atoms), which each literal indicating the truth-value of the
respective atom. Thus, for the logic generated from P “
tp, qu, the valuation in which p is true and q is false will
be represented as tp,qu. Satisfaction of a formula α P L
by v P U is deﬁned in the usual truth-functional way and is
denoted by v , α.
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KLM-style conditional logic
As indicated above, our proposal is an expressivity en-
richment of the preferential conditional logic proposed by
(Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990; Lehmann and Magi-
dor 1992; Lehmann 1995), often referred to as the KLM ap-
proach. The conditional language used in such an approach
is based on conditional expressions α |„ β, read as ‘Typi-
cally, if α then β’. Reasoning in such a conditional frame-
work means to be able, given a set of conditionals, to de-
rive new conditionals. KLM (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor
1990) provide the following list of formal properties that the
conditional |„ ought to satisfy:
pRefq α |„ α pLLEq |ù α Ø β, α |„ γ
β |„ γ
pAndq α |„ β, α |„ γ
α |„ β ^ γ pOrq
α |„ γ, β |„ γ
α _ β |„ γ
pRWq α |„ β, |ù β Ñ γ
α |„ γ pCMq
α |„ β, α |„ γ
α ^ β |„ γ
A conditional satisfying such properties is called a prefer-
ential conditional. We can add another desired property:
(RM)
α |„ γ, α |j β
α ^ β |„ γ
A preferential conditional that satisﬁes also (RM) is called
a rational conditional. For a better understanding of the
reasons behind such desiderata and of the correlated se-
mantic constructions, the reader is referred to the work by
Kraus et al. (1990) and Lehmann and Magidor (1992).
Propositional Typicality Logic
The language of PTL, denoted by L‚, is recursively deﬁned
as follows:
α ::“ p | α | α ^ α | ‚α
where, as before, p denotes an atom and all the other con-
nectives are deﬁned in terms of  and ^, and J and K are
seen as abbreviations.
Intuitively, a sentence of the form ‚α is understood to re-
fer to the typical situations in which α holds. (Note that α
can itself be a ‚-sentence.)
Let P “ tb, f, p, ou, where the propositions b, f, p and o
stand for, respectively, “Tweety is a bird”, “Tweety ﬂies”,
“Tweety is a penguin” and “Tweety is an ostrich”. The
following are examples of L‚-sentences: ‚b, o Ñ  ‚ b,
pp _ oq Ø pb ^ ‚fq.
The semantics of PTL is in terms of structures we call
ranked interpretations.
Deﬁnition 1 (Ranked Interpretation) A ranked interpre-
tation R is a pair xV,ăy, where V Ď U and ă Ď V ˆ V is
a modular order over V .
Observe that modular orders can be obtained from total pre-
orders by imposing anti-symmetry.
Given a setX ,ăĎ XˆX is modular if and only if there
is a ranking function rk : X ÝÑ N s.t. for every x, y P X ,
x ă y iff rkpxq ă rkpyq. Given a ranked interpretation R,
the intuition is that valuations lower down in the order-
ing are more preferred (or deemed more normal or typical)
than those higher up. We can write a ranked interpretation
R “ xV,ăy alternatively as a partition R “ pL0, . . . , Lnq
of V , where v ă v1 iff v P Li, v1 P Lj and i ă j. That is, Li
is the set of all valuations of rank i. Given a ranked interpre-
tation R “ xV,ăy and a formula α P L‚, every valuation v
in V either satisﬁes or does not satisfy α. The notion of sat-
isfaction is deﬁned inductively in the classical way, adding
the following condition
v , ‚α iff v , α and there is no v1 ă v s.t. v1 , α
With αR we denote the set of all valuations satisfying α
in a ranked interpretation R. Given α P L‚ and R a ranked
interpretation, we say that α is satisﬁable in R if αR ‰
H, otherwise α is unsatisﬁable in R. We say that α is true
in R (denoted as R , α) if αR “ V . A knowledge base
K is a ﬁnite set of formulae K Ď L‚, and R , K if R , α
for every α P K.
Figure 1 depicts an example of ranked interpretation for
P “ tb, f, pu.
R
L2 : tb, f, pu
L1 : tb,f,pu tb,f, pu
L0 : tb,f,pu tb, f,pu tb, f,pu
Figure 1: An L‚-interpretation for P “ tb, f, pu.
In the ranked interpretation R of Figure 1, we have
‚bR “ ttb, f,puu, ‚pR “ ttb,f, puu and ‚pb ^
fqR “ ttb,f,pu, tb,f, puu.
A useful property of the typicality operator ‚ is that it
allows us to express KLM-style conditionals. Given a ranked
interpretationR “ xV ,ăy, for α, β P L,R , α |„ β iff all
the ă-minimal valuations satisfying α also satisfy β.
Proposition 1 (Booth et al. (2013)) Let R “ xV,ăy. For
every α, β P L (i.e., α and β are propositional formulae),
R , α |„ β if and only ifR , ‚α Ñ β.
In other words, the KLM framework can be embedded in
PTL. The converse does not hold, as witnessed by the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 2 There are L‚-sentences that cannot be ex-
pressed as a set of KLM-style |„-statements.
Hence, PTL does indeed add to the expressivity of
the KLM approach. However, nesting of the typicality oper-
ator does not increase the expressivity any further, provided
that we are allowed to add new propositional atoms (Booth,
Meyer, and Varzinczak 2013, Theorem 18) via renaming.
Deﬁnition 2 We say a formula α P L‚ is in normal form iff
it is of the form p‚θ1 ^ . . . ^ ‚θtq Ñ pφ ^ p‚ψ1 _ . . . _
‚ψsqq, where t, s ě 0 and the θk, φ and ψk are all purely
propositional formulae.
It can be shown that every formula in L‚ is equivalent to
one in normal form, i.e., the normal form is complete for L‚.
This fact will be exploited in Section 5.
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We have seen in Proposition 1 that rational conditionals
for propositional logic can be expressed in PTL. The repre-
sentation result below, that extends, for L‚, Theorem 3.12
of Lehmann and Magidor (1992), shows that the formalisa-
tion of the KLM-style rational conditional |„ inside PTL is
appropriate.
Theorem 1 Let R be a ranked interpretation and let |„R
:“ tpα, βq | α, β P L‚ and α |„R βu. Then |„R is a ratio-
nal conditional. Conversely, for every rational conditional
|„ there exists a ranked interpretationR such that |„R“ |„.
For more details on PTL and the aforementioned prop-
erties, the reader is referred to the book chapter by
Booth et al. (2013).
3 The entailment problem for PTL
This section provides a more formal motivation for the rest
of the paper. From the perspective of knowledge representa-
tion and reasoning (KR&R), a central issue is that of what
it means for a PTL sentence to follow from a (ﬁnite) knowl-
edge base K. An obvious approach to the matter is to follow
the approach to entailment advocated by Tarski (1956) and
largely adopted in the logic-based KR&R community. Let
ModpKq indicate the set of ranked interpretations satisfying
K, which we refer to as the ranked models of K.
Deﬁnition 3 (Ranked Entailment) Let K Ď L‚ and α P
L‚. Then K ranked-entails α (noted K |ù0 α) if and only if
for every ranked interpretationR P ModpKq,R , α.
Given the notion of ranked entailment above, its associ-
ated consequence operator is deﬁned as expected in the fol-
lowing way.
Deﬁnition 4 (Ranked Consequence) Let K Ď L‚.
Cn0pKq ”def tα P L‚ | K |ù0 αu.
To see why this notion of consequence is not appropriate
in the context of PTL, consider the following deﬁnition of a
conditional induced from a PTL knowledge base.
Deﬁnition 5 (Induced |„) Let X Ď L‚ be an arbitrary
(possibly inﬁnite) set of formulae. Then |„X :“ tpα, βq |
α, β P L and ‚α Ñ β P X u.
It is reasonable to expect the conditional |„Cn0pKq to be ra-
tional, i.e., to satisfy all the KLM properties for rationality.
However, the following proposition, which mimics a similar
result by KLM in the propositional case, shows that this is
not the case:
Proposition 3 (Booth et al. (2013)) |„Cn0pKq is a preferen-
tial conditional, but is not necessarily a rational conditional.
Hence, ranked consequence as deﬁned above, delivers an
induced defeasible consequence that is preferential but that
needs not be rational. This witnesses against ranked entail-
ment as an appropriate notion of entailment for PTL.
A concrete argument against ranked consequence is given
by the following example.
Example 1 First of all, we would like to have an entailment
relation that satisﬁes the presumption of typicality. Infor-
mally, this means we assume for every situation that it is as
typical as possible. Let K1 :“ tp Ñ b, ‚b Ñ fu (“penguins
are birds” and “birds typically ﬂy”). Given just this infor-
mation about birds and penguins, it is reasonable to assume
that penguins are typical birds and expect ‚p Ñ f to fol-
low from K1 (Sections 4 and 6 contain a formalization of
this principle.). It is not hard to see that with ranked conse-
quence this requirement is not met. As a second desideratum,
and strictly related to the ﬁrst one, we would like our entail-
ment relation also to be defeasible, that is, the conclusions
derived under the presumption of typicality can be retracted
in case of new conﬂicting information. For example, even if
‚p Ñ f could follow from K1, let K2 :“ K1 Y t‚p Ñ fu
(add toK1 that “penguins typically do not ﬂy”), we are now
in a situation in which we are informed that penguins are
not typical birds (they do not ﬂy), and now we do not want
‚p Ñ f to follow fromK2. With an entailment relation based
on ranked entailment, also the requirement of defeasibility is
violated.
Rational closure of conditional KBs
In the restricted setting of conditional knowledge bases,
Lehmann and Magidor (1992) proposed the rational clo-
sure construction. Their idea was to deﬁne a preference re-
lation ĲLM over the set of possible ranked interpretations
and then to base entailment on choosing only the most pre-
ferred, i.e., minimal, ranked models of the KB K. The re-
lation ĲLM can be perhaps most easily described using
the representations of ranked interpretations in terms of se-
quences pL1, . . . , Lnq. For any pair of ranked interpretations
R1 “ pL1, . . . , Lnq and R2 “ pM1, . . . ,Mnq (we can as-
sume they are of the same length, ﬁll up the tail with H
otherwise), we set
R1 ĲLM R2 iff either Li “ Mi for all i
or for the ﬁrst j s.t. Lj ‰ Mj
we have Lj Ě Mj
This is not exactly the way it was deﬁned by Lehmann and
Magidor, but this representation can easily be derived from
other work on rational closure such as that of Booth and
Paris (1998) and Giordano et al.(2012). The idea is that those
ranked interpretations should be preferred in which as many
valuations as possible are judged to be as plausible as K al-
lows.
Clearly ĲLM forms a partial order over ranked interpreta-
tions. Lehmann and Magidor showed that, for conditional
K, there exists a unique ĲLM-minimum element RrcpKq
among all the ranked interpretations of K. We will refer to
this element as the LM-minimum. Then the rational closure
of K is the relation |„RrcpKq. In Section 5 we will see what
happens when we try to extend this construction to arbitrary
knowledge bases in L‚.
4 Towards a notion of entailment for PTL
We have seen that ranked entailment has some drawbacks.
Therefore, the question as to what logical consequence
in PTL should mean remains mostly unanswered. In this sec-
tion we ﬁrst specify and discuss a list of properties that, at
ﬁrst glance, seem reasonable for an appropriate notion of en-
tailment in the context of PTL. In the subsequent section we
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consider speciﬁc alternatives to ranked entailment and check
them against our desiderata.
We start by introducing some notation. With |ù? Ď
PpL‚q ˆ L‚, we denote any entailment relation on the lan-
guage of PTL. Given an entailment relation |ù?, its asso-
ciated consequence operator is deﬁned in the usual way as
follows, where K Ď L‚:
Cn?pKq ”def tα P L‚ | K |ù? αu
The obvious starting point is to consider some properties
of consequence operators as proposed by Tarski (1956). The
ﬁrst two of them are:
P1 K Ď Cn?pKq (Inclusion)
P2 Cn?pKq “ Cn?pCn?pKqq (Idempotency)
A justiﬁcation for Inclusion is quite obvious: whatever is
in a knowledge base, it must be amongst its consequences.
Idempotency, also known as Iteration, speciﬁes that a con-
sequence operator behaves as a ‘once-off’ operation, in the
same spirit as that of a closure operator. There is an agree-
ment in the literature that both Inclusion and Idempotency
are desirable properties to have.
Ranked entailment, as deﬁned in Section 3, satisﬁes Prop-
erties P1–P2. However, Cn0p¨q also satisﬁes the classical
property of Monotonicity: If K Ď K1, then Cn0pKq Ď
Cn0pK1q. As seen in Example 1, this is a property that we
do not want Cn?p¨q to satisfy (at least not in general).
So, we require Cn?p¨q to be a nonmonotonic consequence
operator. Traditionally, this amounts to requiring Cn?p¨q to
satisfy the following two properties:
P3 Cn0pKq Ď Cn?pKq (Ampliativeness)
P4 For some K,K1 Ď L‚, K Ď K1 but Cn?pKq Ę Cn?pK1q
(Defeasibility)
Ampliativeness, sometimes referred to as supra-
classicality, namely when the basic underlying entailment
relation is classical, says that Cn?p¨q should be more ‘ven-
turous’ than its underlying ranked entailment. In Example
1, we have ‚p Ñ f R Cn0pK1q, i.e., it does not follow that
“penguins typically ﬂy”. However, given the information
in K1, a case can be made for having ‚p Ñ f as a plausible
(though provisional) conclusion, e.g. in the absence of
information to the contrary.
Defeasibility speciﬁes that Cn?p¨q should be ﬂexible
enough to disallow previously derived conclusions in the
light of new (possibly conﬂicting) information. In Example
1, assuming ‚p Ñ f P Cn?pK1q is the case, then ‚p Ñ f
should no longer be concluded if ‚p Ñ f is added to K1.
Similarly to Lehmann and Magidor in the propositional
case, we would ideally like the defeasible inference relation
associated with Cn?pKq to satisfy all the KLM rationality
properties:
P5 |„Cn?pKq is a rational conditional on L (Conditional
Rationality)
The following “single model” property can be straightfor-
wardly shown to be a strengthening of P5:
P6 For every K Ď L‚, there is a ranked interpretation R
such that R , K and, for all α P L‚, α P Cn?pKq if and
only ifR , α (Single Model)
In the special case whenK is a (propositional) conditional
knowledge base (i.e., when K is of the form t‚α Ñ β |
α, β P Lu), the result should coincide with Lehmann and
Magidor’s deﬁnition of rational closure:
P7 If K is a conditional knowledge base, then
|„Cn?pKq“|„RrcpKq (Extends Rational Closure)
Finally, the following two properties were shown by
Lehmann and Magidor to be satisﬁed by the rational clo-
sure for conditional knowledge bases. They say that Cn?p¨q
should coincide with ranked entailment for certain restricted
classes of sentences.
P8 Let α P L. Then α P Cn?pKq if and only if α P Cn0pKq
(Strict Entailment)
P9 Let α P L. Then ‚J Ñ α P Cn?pKq if and only if
‚J Ñ α P Cn0pKq (Typical Entailment)
5 LM-entailment
We now come to our ﬁrst construction of a consequence op-
erator in PTL. The idea is to try to lift the rational closure
construction from conditional knowledge bases to arbitrary
knowledge bases in L‚. As a promising sign, we ﬁrst ob-
serve that there is nothing to stop us from using the prefer-
ence relation ĲLM to compare ranked interpretations of any
PTL knowledge base K. The question is, does there always
exist a unique LM-minimum element of the ranked models
of K, as there does in the restricted conditional case? And if
so, how can we construct it? We answer these questions in
this section.
We assume as input a PTL knowledge base K “
tα1, . . . , αnu. We assume that each sentence αj is in nor-
mal form (see Deﬁnition 2). For any ranked interpretation
R “ xV,ăy and S Ď V , we deﬁneR Ó S (the restriction of
R to S) as xV X S,ă XpS ˆ Sqy.
We construct a sequence pR0,R1, . . .q of ranked inter-
pretations as follows, where Ri “ xU ,ăiy (i.e., the set of
valuations V is always the full set of all valuations):
1. Initialise ă0:“ H
start with an initial ranked interpretation in which all val-
uations are equally preferred.
2. Si`1 :“ KRi
separate the valuations which satisfy K w.r.t. the current
ranked interpretationRi from those that do not.
3. If Si`1 “ Si then STOP and returnR˚pKq “ Ri Ó Si`1.
if the division is the same as in the previous round then
eliminate completely from the current ranked interpreta-
tion those valuations that do not satisfy K w.r.t. Ri and
return the interpretation that remains.
4. Otherwise ăi`1:“ăi YpSi`1 ˆ Sci`1q, i :“ i` 1 and go
to 2.
otherwise create a new ranked interpretation Ri`1 by
making every valuation not in Si`1 less plausible than
every valuation in Si`1. (Note Sc denotes UzS.)
42
Example 2 Assume P “ tp, q, tu and that the knowledge
base K is composed by the formulae:
‚J Ñ pp ^ qq, ‚p Ñ ‚t, ‚q Ñ ‚t
The procedure initialises with ă0“ H. The only valu-
ations that satisfy all three formulae w.r.t. R0 are those
satisfying both p and q. Thus S1 “ KR0 “
ttp,q, tu, tp,q,tuu and so we obtainR1 by setting
ă1 to be the 2-layer modular order with S1 as the lower
layer. Note that ‚tR1 “ ttp,q, tuu and ‚tR1 “
ttp,q,tuu, so we can see that none of valuations in Sc1
are able to satisfy either ‚p Ñ ‚t or ‚q Ñ ‚t w.r.t. R1.
As a consequence S2 “ KR1 “ S1 and so the procedure
terminates here with R˚pKq “ R1 Ó S2. That is, R˚pKq
is the ranked interpretation consisting of just a single layer
containing tp,q, tu and tp,q,tu.
We now need to show a number of things: (i) The algorithm
will always terminate, (ii) it returns a ranked interpretation
which furthermore satisﬁes K, and (iii) for any other ranked
model of K we haveR˚pKq ĲLM R.
We know the following about the ﬁrst two items:
Lemma 1 Assuming each sentence in K is in normal form,
the following hold for each i ě 0:
(i). Si Ď Si`1, i.e., KRi´1 Ď KRi .
(ii). For all v1, v2 P U , if v1 ăi v2 then v1 P KRi .
(iii).Ri`1 is a ranked interpretation, i.e.,ăi`1 is a modular
order.
From part (i) above we know that the algorithm termi-
nates, since it generates a sequence of ranked (by part (iii))
interpretations in which the set of valuations satisfyingK in-
creases monotonically from one ranked interpretation to the
next. Since each ranked interpretation is ﬁnite the stopping
criterion in step 3 of the algorithm is guaranteed to occur
eventually.
To show that the algorithm returns a ranked model of K it
sufﬁces to show the following.
Lemma 2 Assuming each sentence in K is in normal form,
for each i ě 0,Ri Ó Si`1 is a model of K.
So at each stage of the algorithm, the current ranked in-
terpretation, when those valuations not satisfying K are ex-
cluded, forms a ranked interpretation of K. Since the output
R˚pKq of the algorithm takes precisely this form we have
the following result.
Theorem 2 Assuming each sentence inK is in normal form,
we haveR˚pKq , K.
Next we want to show that for any other ranked inter-
pretation of K we have R˚pKq ĲLM R. Let R˚pKq “
pS1, . . . , Smq and let R “ pT1, . . . , Tmq be any other
ranked interpretation of K. If one of the two sequences is
shorter than the other, we simply ﬁll its tail with an appro-
priate number of empty sets to ensure the sequences have
equal length.
Lemma 3 Let i ě 1. If Tj “ Sj for all j ă i then Ti Ď Si.
From this lemma we can state:
Theorem 3 Assume each sentence in K is in normal form
and letR be a ranked interpretation such thatR , K. Then
R˚pKq ĲLM R.
We will denote by CnLMp¨q the consequence operator de-
ﬁned viaR˚pKq, i.e., CnLMpKq “ tα P L‚ | R˚pKq , αu.
The next result outlines which properties from the previous
section are satisﬁed by CnLMp¨q.
Proposition 4 CnLMp¨q satisﬁes Inclusion, Ampliativeness,
Defeasibility, Conditional Rationality, Single Model, Ex-
tends Rational Closure and Typical Entailment, but not
Strict Entailment.
6 Different notions of minimality
As we have seen above, LM-entailment does not satisfy all
the proposed properties. An alternative deﬁnition, proposed
by Booth and Paris (1998) is not applicable here since, in
the language of PTL, we are not guaranteed that the ﬁnal
interpretation we obtain is still a ranked model of the rel-
evant KB. We shall therefore consider a third option, one
that is directly derived from the characterisation of ratio-
nal closure by Giordano et al. (2012). The general idea is
to respect the presumption of typicality ((Lehmann 1995),
p.63). Such a principle indicates the way in which the prop-
erty (RM) should be satisﬁed: we have α |„ γ in our KB
K; in order to satisfy (RM) we have to add either α |„ β
or α ^ β |„ γ; the presumption of typicality imposes that,
whenever it is possible, we prefer the latter (that corresponds
to a constrained application of monotony) over the former.
Semantically, given the ranked models of a KB K, such a
presumption corresponds to considering only those interpre-
tations in which every valuation is considered as typical as
possible, that is, it is ‘pushed downward’ in the interpreta-
tion as much as possible, modulo the satisfaction of K.
In order to identify the interpretations that can be inter-
esting for the deﬁnition of a notion of entailment, we can
introduce a preference relation ď between the ranked inter-
pretations that follows directly from the presumption of typ-
icality. To do that, we need a notion to compare the relative
positions of the valuations between the models of a KB.
Deﬁnition 6 (Height function) For a (ﬁnite) ranked inter-
pretation R “ xV ,ăy and v P V , the height hRpvq of v
corresponds to the number of the layer in R in which v is
positioned, or to 8 if it is not in the interpretation. That is,
given thatR “ pL0, . . . , Lnq,
hRpvq “
"
i if v P Li, for 0 ď i ď n
8 otherwise.
The lower the height of a valuation in an interpretation,
the more typical such a valuation is considered in the ranked
interpretation, while the height value is 8 if the valuation
does not appear in the interpretation at all. Using the notion
of height we can deﬁne a preorder over the interpretations.
Deﬁnition 7 (Relation ď) Given a knowledge base K and
two of its models R “ xVR,ăRy and R1 “ xVR1 ,ăR1y,
R is at least as preferred as R1 (R ď R1) iff for every
w P U , hRpwq ď hR1pwq. R is preferred to R1 (R ă R1)
iffR ď R1 andR1 ­ď R.
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Consistent with the use of the presumption of typicality
as a guideline in the choice of the relevant interpretations,
the relation ď can be used to identify the relevant interpre-
tations for the deﬁnition of a notion of entailment: that is,
we should choose the models of K in which the valuations
are presumed to be as typical as possible, that is, the relevant
models are those that are in minďpModpKqq, with
minďpModpKqq “ tR P ModpKq | ER1 s.t.
R1 P ModpKq andR1 ă Ru.
The use of the value 8 for the height function allows us to
compare also interpretations containing distinct sets of val-
uations. Such a possibility is desirable since we do not want
to consider as a possible candidate for a notion of entailment
an interpretation that is a sub-interpretation of another one:
given the models of a knowledge base and considering the
minimal ones, we prefer those that do not make unjustiﬁed
assumptions w.r.t. the classic knowledge, that is, we prefer
the models that do not eliminate valuations without having
the presumption of typicality as motivation.
It is easy to check that ď is a preorder. Now, given a
knowledge baseK, to deﬁne a closure operation we consider
only the (preferred) models contained in minďpModpKqq.
If we are using KBs composed only of the classical non-
monotonic conditionals α |„ β, it corresponds exactly to
LM-minimality as deﬁned in the previous sections (Gior-
dano et al. 2012). However, due to the expressivity of our
language we obtain the surprising result that the two seman-
tic constructions are not equivalent anymore. Moreover, in
the present context, this notion of minimality can give back a
number of minimal models, as the following example shows.
Example 3 Consider the knowledge base K from Example
2. The interpretations in minďpModpKqq are the following
ones:
R1 L0 : tp,q, tu tp,q,tu
R2
L2 : tp,q,tu
L1 : tp,q, tu tp,q, tu
L0 : tp,q,tu
R3
L2 : tp, q, tu
L1 : tp, q,tu tp,q,tu
L0 : tp,q, tu
Note that the ﬁrst of the three models in the example is
the LM-minimal model of K. In fact it is easy to check from
the characterisation of rational closure in Section 3 and Def-
inition 7 that every LM-minimal model of a KB K is also in
minďpModpKqq.
Proposition 5 For every knowledge base K, the LM -
minimal model of K is in minďpModpKqq.
We can deﬁne the notion of entailment |ùď corresponding
to the present notion of minimality, as
K |ùď α iff @R P minď pKq,R , α
This notion is inferentially weaker than the one based on
LM-minimality since it is deﬁned on a possibly larger set of
models. Can this notion of entailment satisfy all our desider-
ata? It satisﬁes most of them.
Proposition 6 |ùď satisﬁes (P1), (P2), (P3), (P4),(P7),(P8),
and (P9).
Unfortunately, Conditional Rationality (P5) is not valid.
Proposition 7 The conditional |„ induced by |ùď is not a
rational conditional.
To see this, consider Example 3: we have that K |ùď
p |„ q, but we do not have neither K |ùď p |„ t,
nor K |ùď p ^ t |„ q.
We can consider another candidate for a notion of entail-
ment, in order to augment the inferential power w.r.t. ranked
entailment and preserve also Strict Entailment. We could
consider only the models inminďpKq with the biggest (w.r.t.
Ď) universe. That is we would consider a set minĚďpKq s.t.
Ě
minď pKq “ tR “ pV,ăq | R P minď pKq and
ER1 “ pV 1,ă1q s.t.R1 P minď pKq and V
1 Ą Vu
And the corresponding entailment relation |ùĚď would be
K |ùĚď α iff @R P
Ě
minď pKq,R , α
For instance, in Example 3 we would consider only R2
andR3. |ùĚď is inferentially stronger than |ùď.
Proposition 8 |ùďĂ|ùĚď.
But using |ùĚď we obtain an entailment relation that once
again does not satisfy (P5), and moreover does not satisfy
(P9).
Proposition 9 |ùĚď does not satisfy Conditional Rationality
(P5) and Typical Entailment (P9).
Both Proposition 8 and the failure of (P9) can be checked
looking at Example 3: K |ùĚď p‚J Ñ tq _ p‚J Ñ tq,
that does not hold considering |ùď (and obviously it does
not hold also for ranked entailment). For (P5) consider the
same example used for |ùď.
So, we are not able to ﬁnd an entailment relation for our
enriched language that satisﬁes all our desiderata. Actually,
we can give the following impossibility result, showing that
some postulates stand in conﬂict with some of the others.
Proposition 10 There is no consequence operator Cn?p¨q
satisfying all of Inclusion (P1), Single Model (P6), Strict
Entailment (P8) and Typical Entailment (P9).
7 Concluding remarks
The main contributions of the present work can be summa-
rized as follows: (i) the provision of a set of desiderata char-
acterizing the behavior of a notion of entailment deemed ap-
propriate in the context of PTL; (ii) the deﬁnition of the no-
tion of minimum entailment and its assessment against the
stated desiderata—in particular we provide a constructive
method for generating the (ﬁnite) minimum model; (iii) an
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investigation of alternative deﬁnitions of minimal entailment
and their relationship with our constructions and desiderata.
Our results in the propositional setting pave the way for
an investigation of appropriate forms of entailment in other,
more expressive, preferential approaches, such as preferen-
tial description logics (Britz, Meyer, and Varzinczak 2011;
Britz et al. 2013; Giordano et al. 2013) and logics of defea-
sible modalities (Britz and Varzinczak 2013). The move to
logics with more structure, both in the syntax and in the se-
mantics, is of a challenging nature, and a simple rephrasing
of our approach to these logics may not deliver the expected
results. We are currently investigating these issues.
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